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NOTE
CIVILIAN REVIEW OF MILITARY HABEAS CORPUS
PETITIONS: IS JUSTICE BEING SERVED?
I. INTRODUCTION -
American society has historically tended to view military institutions and
actions with a skeptical eye.1 Despite this phenomenon, the military as an
institution has grown and commanded a significant amount of the nation's
wealth, both in human and material terms. Military institutions, though a
necessary "organ of government," have created perplexing problems. While
the maintenance of military power is a necessary element of national security,
it is also a type of power and authority which is not easily assimilated into a
democratic society. 2 At times the courts have been called upon to define the
proper balance that must be struck between this power and the rights of
individual members of the armed forces. This review, however, has had
significant limitations, so that primary responsibility for control of the military
must lie with the legislative and executive branches of government, and
ultimately with the people themselves. 3
This Note will examine the scope of review available to a civilian court
when dealing with court-martial proceedings, both in an historical context, as
well as in light of the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Calley v. Callaway.4
II. THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
Before relief from a court-martial conviction can be sought by a serviceman
in civilian courts, he must generally first exhaust the remedies provided for
him by the military justice system. 5 This system provides for trial by
1. See The Federalist No. 41, at 260 (P.L. Ford ed. 1898) (J. Madison) where it was stated:
"A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary,
provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences
may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise
nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from
any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing
both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties."
Id. at 263. See also Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 183-85
(1962).
2. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 181, 182 (1962).
3. Id. at 183.
4. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. April 6, 1976) (No.
75-773).
5. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1950). The "exhaustion doctrine" is a restriction,
not on the existence of a federal power, but on its use. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963);
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 703, 714 (2d Cir,
1968). The doctrine is a flexible one, and its underlying principles must be assessed in light of the
burdens which would be imposed if it were carried out. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S.
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courts-martial, which are tribunals convened on an ad hoc basis in accor-
dance with military needs. 6 Courts-martial are not courts of general jurisdic-
tion and can be either general, 7 special, 8 or summary, 9 with the power to
convene them varying in accordance with the rank and command of the
convening authority.10 Besides having the power to convene the courts-
martial, the convening authority has the power to select the court members
from those members of the armed forces who are eligible to serve," and it
479, 485 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969). It is designed to provide for
judicial efficiency and to ensure that military courts and agencies will have the first opportunity to
review and decide controversial issues. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756-57
(1975); Dooley v. Ploger, 491 F.2d 608, 613 (4th Cir. 1974); Sohm v. Fowler, 365"F.2d 915,
917-18 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In addition, the doctrine is designed to eliminate interjudicial friction,
and gives the military a chance to express its views. This is important because civilian judges are
generally not familiar with military procedures and requiremerits. See Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S.
683, 694 (1969); Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial
Convictions, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 40, 66 (1961); Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal
Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 Ind. L.J. 539, 541 (1974).
6. The constitutional basis for the military justice system is article I of the Constitution,
which grants to Congress the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857); Ex parte Dickey,
204 F. 322, 325 (D. Me. 1913). The power to establish courts-martial is implicitly recognized in
the fifth amendment: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces . . . ." U.S. Const. amend V.
7. A general court-martial consists of a military judge and not less than five members, or, if
the accused requests and the military judge approves, a military judge alone. Id. § 816(1). A
general court-martial has jurisdiction to try all offenses, including those which violate the law of
war, and may adjudge any sentence not proscribed, including death. Id. § 818.
8. A special court-martial consists of not less than three members, or a military judge
and not less than three members, or if the accused so requests, a military judge alone if one
has been detailed to the court and the military judge approves. Id § 816(2). A special
court-martial has jurisdiction to try any noncapital offense. It may also try capital offenses under
regulations established by the President. A special court-martial can adjudge any sentence except
death, dishonorable discharge, dismissal, confinement for more than six months, hard labor
without confinement for more than three months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds pay per
month, or forfeiture of pay for more than six months. Id. § 819. A bad conduct discharge cannot
be adjudged unless the accused was represented by qualified defense counsel and (except in
unusual circumstances) a military judge presided. In addition, a verbatim record of the proceed-
ing must be made. Id.
9. A summary court-matrial consists of one commissioned officer. Id. § 816(3). A sum-
mary court-martial has jurisdiction to try only enlisted personnel for any noncapital offense.
Summary courts-martial may impose any sentence except death, dismissal, dishonorable or
bad-conduct discharge, confinement for more than one month, hard labor without confinement
for more than forty-five days, restriction to specified limits for more than two months, or
forfeiture of more than two-thirds of one month's pay. Id. § 820. In addition, an individual who
could be tried by a summary court-martial can be subjected to a special court-martial if he objects
thereto. Id.
10. Id. §§ 822-24.
11. Id. § 825(d)(2).
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has the power to perform the first review of the record of trial. 12 It is also
given the preliminary power to approve or disapprove the findings of the
court-martial. 1
3
After the convening authority has completed the initial review of the
court-martial findings and sentence, the case may be reviewed by a Court of
Military Review, depending on the nature of the sentence. 14 Court-martial
convictions without punitive discharges are referred to the Judge Advocate
General of the respective service who may refer the case to a Court of Military
Review. 15 The Court of Military Review occupies the intermediate level in
the military justice system. In addition to reviewing the sentence, the court
can review questions of law and fact, as well as judge the credibility of
witnesses. 
16
After a decision in the Court of Military Review, the case may then be
appealed to the United States Court of Military Appeals. 17 The court consists
of three civilian judges appointed for fifteen year terms by the President. 18 It
must review a case coming from the Court of Military Review if the sentence
as affirmed is death, if it involves a general or flag officer, or if it is certified
for review by the Judge Advocate General. 19 In other cases coming from the
12. Id. § 860. This written review is usually on the basis of a written opinion of the staff
judge advocate to the convening authority. Id. § 861.
13. See id. §§ 862-64. The broad powers of the military commander are subject to abuse and
have been the focus of much concern. See generally West, Command Influence, In J. Finn,
Conscience and Command 73-135 (1971); Murphy, The Army Defense Counsel: Unusual Ethics
for an Unusual Advocate, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 233, 237-40 (1961); West, A History of Command
Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1 (1970). See also R. Sherrill,
Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music (1969), a hostile account of military
legal proceedings against dissenters in the Vietnam conflict. It is a violation of 10 U.S.C. § 837
(1970) to attempt to unlawfully influence the actions of a court-martial.
14. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970). The Judge Advocate General reviews court-martial convictions
which do not fall within the court-martial jurisdiction of the Court of Military Review. Id. § 869.
He may vacate or modify in whole or in part the sentence or findings, or both, in any
court-martial that has been finally reviewed, but has not been reviewed by a Court of Military
Review. Id.
15. Court of Military Review jurisdiction is limited to cases where "the sentence, as
approved, affects a general or flag officer or extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer,
cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or
more." Id. § 866(b). Cases which lie outside of this jurisdictional base cannot generally be subject
to review by any military appellate court. The Judge Advocate General may, however, certify the
record of any general court-martial resulting in a conviction to the Court of Military Review
regardless of the sentence. Id. § 869. However, there can then be no further review by the United
States Court of Military Appeals unless the-judge Advocate General further certifies the case for
review, id. § 867(b)(2), or, upon petition of the accused and good cause shown, the Court of
Military Appeals grants a review, id. § 867(b)(3), or the sentence affects a general or flag officer or
extendS to death. Id. § 867(b)(1).
16. Id. § 866(c).
17. Although its members are civilians, the Court of Military Appeals is located for adminis-
trative purposes in the Department of Defense. Id. § 867(a)(1).
18. Id. § 867(a)(1).
19. Id. § 867(b)(1),(2).
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Court of Military Review, the court can review in its discretion2 0 if the
accused has filed a petition for review within thirty days after the accused is
notified of the decision of the Court of Military Review. 2 ' Once the Court of
Military Appeals has taken jurisdiction of a case it can only review questions
of law22 and any decision it reaches is final. 2 3
Although Congress has provided no direct appeal from the military court
system to the Supreme Court, 24 review by civilian courts and ultimately by
the Supreme Court may occur as a result of collateral attack. Historically,
where confinement has been imposed, 25 the primary avenue for securing such
20. One author has noted that the Courts of Military Review have acted in about six percent
of courts-martial. The Court of Military Appeals, in turn, has acted in only about seventeen
percent of the cases referred to the Court of Military Review. See Willis, The United States Court
of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 Mil. L. Rev. 39, 76 n.189 (1972). This
is not surprising since many of the sanctions imposed by the military are "more akin to
administrative or civil sanctions than to civilian criminal ones." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
751 (1974).
21. 10 U.S.C. § 867(c) (1970).
22. Id. § 867(d).
23. Id. § 876. This section has not, however, been construed as barring a collateral attack in
federal courts, see Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 749-53 (1975); United States v.
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349-50 (1969); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1950),
although it would bar the government from instituting a collateral attack if it lost its case within
the military justice system. See Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768, 772 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
Collateral relief can take many forms, including habeas corpus petitions, see Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953); mandamus, see Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965); Hoorwitz
v. Resor, 329 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 1407 (2d Cir. 1971); declaratory
relief, see Homcy v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and suit for back pay, see Augenblick
v. United States, 377 F.2d 586 (Ct. CI. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 348 (1969). In addition to this
collateral relief, the President must review and approve any court-martial sentence which
involves death or affects a general or flag officer. 10 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1970). The secretary of each
respective service must also approve the dismissal of a commissioned officer, other than a general
or flag officer, cadet, or midshipman, id. § 871(b), and he has the power to "remit or suspend any
part or amount of the unexecuted part of any sentence, including all uncollected forfeitures other
than a sentence approved by the President." Id. § 874(a). The Judge Advocate General, if the
accused so petitions, may grant a new trial "[alt any time within two years after approval by the
convening authority of a court-martial sentence," on the grounds of fraud or newly discovered
evidence. Id. § 873.
24. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746 (1975); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126
(1900); Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d 301, 304 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966);
Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
25. See, e.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1885) (there must be actual
confinement); United States ex rel. McKiever v. Jack, 351 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1965) (per
curiam) (normal restraint incident to service in armed forces not enough to justify issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus). Some later cases have shown a willingness to relax the custody
requirement. -See, e.g., Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 41S F.2d 991, 994 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970); United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding
Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 373 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929 (1969); Hammond v.
Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 710-12 (2d Cir. 1968).
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review has been through the writ of habeas corpus.2 6 The first case to reach
the Supreme Court concerning the question of habeas corpus review of
military courts-martial was Ex parte Reed.2 7 In Reed, a paymaster clerk in
the United States Navy was charged and convicted of malfeasance in the line
of duty. While in confinement he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus before
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. 28
After failing to secure the relief he desired, Reed petitioned the Supreme
Court to have his conviction reviewed. In passing on the application, the
Court noted:
The [military] court had jurisdiction over the person and the case. It is the organism
provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of
cases. Having had such jurisdiction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached
for any mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed within the sphere of
its authority.
29
Reed thus limited habeas corpus review to questions of whether the military
had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, and whether it had the
power to impose sentence on the accused. 30 In addition, for many years
habeas corpus relief was limited to individuals actually held in confinement. 3 1
From Reed until the early 1950s civilian courts reiterated that in a military
habeas corpus proceeding they could only inquire whether the military had
jurisdiction over the person, subject matter and offense. 32 In addition, such
courts would examine whether the sentence was conformable to law 33 and
whether the court-martial tribunal was legally convened and constituted,3 4
However, because of developments in the civilian sphere, which gave federal
courts the power to review constitutional errors in civilian habeas corpus
cases, 35 many courts concluded that military habeas corpus proceedings
26. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 747 (1975). See note 23 supra for alternative
methods of collateral relief.
27. 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
28. Id. at 19-20.
29. Id. at 23; accord, Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1902), quoting Carter v.
Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 497-98 (1900).
30. In addition to habeas corpus proceedings, there were other avenues for attacking
court-martial convictions at the time of Reed. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65,
82-83 (1857) (action for assault and battery and for false imprisonment); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (replevin); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330 (1806) (trespass). The
issues raised in these cases were limited to questions of jurisdiction.
31. See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 126 (1950); Humphrey v. Smith, 336
U.S. 695, 696 (1949); Mullan v. United States, 212 U.S. 516 (1909); McClaughry v. Deming, 186
U.S. 49, 69 (1902); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 381 (1902); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S.
496, 500 (1900); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1897); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U'S.
109, 118 (1895); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890).
33. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1902).
34. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 63 (1902).
35. Civilian habeas corpus petitions were historically limited to the same extent as military
petitions. In Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), decided the same year as Ex parte Reed, 100
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should be similarly expanded. 36 The Supreme Court in Hiatt v. Brown37 did
not, however, accept such a broad view of jurisdiction. In rejecting an
expansion of civilian court review of military court-martials, the Court stated:
We think the [court of appeals] was in error in extending its review, for the purpose of
determining compliance with the due process clause, to such matters as the proposi-
tions of law set forth in the staff judge advocate's report, the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pretrial investigation,
and the competence of the law member and defense counsel .... It is well settled that
"by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the
proceedings of a court martial .... The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction...." In
this case the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person accused and the offense
charged, and acted within its lawful powers. The correction of any errors it may have
committed is for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review its
decision. 38
Hiatt thus failed to allow an expansion of military habeas corpus proceedings
to include questions cognizable in civilian habeas corpus proceedings. 39 Due
U.S. 13 (1879), the Court held that a writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a writ of error.
The Court stated: "Mere error in the judgment or proceedings, under and by virtue of which a
party is imprisoned, constitutes no ground for the issue of the writ." 100 U.S. at 375. See also
Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925); In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 213 (1911). In Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) the Court expanded civilian habeas corpus review by holding: "A
court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost 'in the course of the proceedings' due
to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires--by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release by habeas corpus. A judge of the United States-to whom a petition for habeas corpus is
addressed-should be alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the
trial absolutely void.' " Id. at 468 (footnotes omitted). Civilian habeas corpus, although still
speaking in terms of jurisdiction, had expanded to include questions of constitutional defects. In
1942, however, the Court abandoned the traditional jurisdictional terminology and held in Waley
v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), that a writ of habeas corpus could be used to attack convictions
obtained in violation of constitutional rights. According to the Court, "the use of the writ in the
federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those
cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render
it. It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving
his rights." Id. at 104-05.
36. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 645, 646 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 874 (1949); Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512, 514 (10th Cir. 1948); United States ex rel.
Weintraub v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1948).
37. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
38. Id. at 110-11 (citations omitted).
39. One commentator outlined the following items as being within the scope of inquiry which
a civil court could exercise in a military habeas corpus proceeding: (1) whether thi court-martial
had jurisdiction over the person; (2) whether the court-martial had jurisdiction over the offense;
(3) whether the court-martial board and legal counsel were duly qualified, and (4) whether the
sentence imposed was in conformity with law. Among the allegations that could not be reviewed,
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process questions were proscribed and left to determination by the military. 40
III. Burns v. Wilson
In 1953 the traditional approach to habeas corpus review in military cases
was changed by the Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson.4 1 The petitioners
were tried by the Air Force, found guilty of murder and rape, and sentenced
to death. In their application for review, petitioners claimed that they had
been denied due process in their court-martial, alleging that they had been
detained illegally; that confessions had been forcibly extracted from them; that
they had been denied effective representation; that evidence favorable to them
had been suppressed; and that perjured testimony had been used against
them.42 Petitioners also alleged that the trial was conducted in an atmosphere
of mob violence. 43 The district court, relying on Hiatt, dismissed the peti-
tions, claiming that once it was determined that the military had jurisdiction
over the person and the offense, it was not within the power of the district
court to review the proceeding for irregularity. 44 The court of appeals45
affirmed but noted in passing that Hiatt should not be read so as to bar
civilian review of constitutional issues in a military context. 46
were the following: "(1) Failure to conduct a thorough and impartial pre-trial investigation prior
to a trial by general court-martial. (2) Failure to provide counsel for the accused at the pre-trial
investigation. (3) Absence of defense counsel and assumption of his own defense by the accused
without objection. (4) Exclusion of civilian defense counsel during presentation of secret official
documents, leaving appointed defense counsel present. (5) Absence of assistant defense counsel
without objection by the accused. (6) Lack of Negro members of a court trying a Negro accused.
(7) Erroneous admission into evidence of an extrajudicial confession. (8) Erroneous inferences
made from the evidence. (9) Failure to furnish the accused with a copy of the opinion of the staff
judge advocate or legal officer. (10) Lack of knowledge of a civilian subject to the Code that he
was so subject. (11) Technical sufficiency of pleadings charging an offense cognizable by a
court-martial. (12) Mistreatment while in custody awaiting trial. (13) Delay in completing
investigation and trial where not substantially prejudicial to the accused's defense. (14) Illegal
apprehension or arrest. (15) Movement of court from one place of convening to another during
trial. (16) Insufficiency of the evidence, where there is not a complete lack of evidence supporting
conviction. (17) Credibility of witnesses. (18) Bar of the statute of limitations." Snedeker, Habeas
Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 288, 298-301 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
40. Shortly after Hiatt was decided, the Tenth Circuit in Kuykendall v. Hunter, 187 F.2d 545
(10th Cir. 1951) appeared to ignore Hiatt and considered a due process attack in a habeas corpus
proceeding. The court noted that "[d]ue process of law must be observed in military trials the
same as [in] trials in civil courts." Id. at 546.
41. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
42. Id. at 138.
43. Id.
44. Dennis v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
aff'd sub nom. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Burns v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 312
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137 (1953).
45. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137 (1953).
46. Judge Prettyman, writing for the court, stated: "in the exceptional case when a denial of a
constitutional right is so flagrant as to affect the 'jurisdiction' (i.e., the basic power) of the tribunal
to render judgment, the courts will review upon petition for habeas corpus." Id. at 342.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson declared in a
plurality opinion47 that military habeas corpus review was traditionally
narrower than analogous review in civilian cases.4 8 Although it failed to
adopt the broad civilian standard, 49 the Court nevertheless appeared to
expand the scope of review in military cases beyond the "jurisdiction only"
test. The Chief Justice declared that in a military habeas corpus proceeding a
civilian court should look to see only if the military dealt "fully and fairly"
with the allegations raised by the petitioners in their application, 5o and that
habeas corpus relief could not be used to reevaluate evidence. 5 1 Justice
Douglas dissented, arguing that a denial of due process should entitle the
petitioners to relief by way of habeas corpus. Moreover, he would at least
have allowed the civilian tribunal the power to determine whether the correct
constitutional standard had been applied. S2
Burns has caused much confusion.5 3 Is a civilian court allowed to review
the record only if the military failed to deal with the constitutional allega-
tions? Or may the civilian court go further and analyze the military's
treatment of these allegations? Soon after Burns, diverse approaches appeared
47. At least one writer argues that this deprives the opinion of any precedential value. See
Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 11, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 266,
297 (1958).
48. 346 U.S. at 139.
49. See note 35 supra.
-50. If the military did not fully and fairly deal with the issues raised, or if they manifestly
refused to consider the claims, then civilian courts would be empowered to review the claims de
novo. 346 U.S. at 142.
51. Id. In a separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter refused to accept any of the approaches
proposed. He declared. "I cannot agree that the only inquiry that is open on an application for
habeas corpus challenging a sentence of a military tribunal is whether that tribunal was legally
constituted and had jurisdiction, technically speaking, over the person and the crime. Again, I
cannot agree that the scope of inquiry is the same as that open to us on review of State
convictions; the content of due process in civil trials does not control what is due process in
military trials. Nor is the duty of the civil courts upon habeas corpus met simply when it is found
that the military sentence has been reviewed by the military hierarchy, although in a debatable
situation we should no doubt attach more weight to the conclusions reached on controversial facts
by military appellate courts than to those reached by the highest court of a State." Id. at 149.
52. According to Justice Douglas, "If the military agency has fairly and conscientiously
applied the standards of due process formulated by this Court, I would agree that a rehash of the
same facts by a federal court would not advance the cause of justice. But where the military
reviewing agency has not done that, a court should entertain the petition for habeas corpus. In
the first place, the military tribunals in question are federal agencies subject to no other judicial
supervision except what is afforded by the federal courts. In the second place, the rules of due
process which they apply are constitutional rules which we, not they, formulate." Id. at 154
(dissenting opinion). Justice Black joined in this dissent.
53. See Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49
Ind. L.J. 539, 567 (1974); Note, Procedural Deficiencies of Courts-Martial and Civilian Judicial
Review: Lieutenant Calley's Case, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. 626, 671 (1975). One commentator has
noted that as of 1961, in not one lower court case "did a soldier-petitioner succeed in obtaining his
liberty." Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial
Convictions, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 40, 60 (1961).
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with some courts reviewing the issues raised de novo, 54 while others seem-
ingly side-stepped the review issue completely.5 While some courts looked at
least to see if the military had reached a correct determination on the issues
raised,5 6 a majority of the courts seemed amenable to the narrow Burns
standard. These latter courts rejected further review once it was determined
that the military had dealt fully and fairly with the issues raised.
5 7
Despite the fact that lower courts have had great difficulty in applying the
Burns standard, the Supreme Court has yet to clarify the proper scope of
review that military habeas corpus proceedings should take, even though the
Court has had at least two recent opportunities" s to clear up some of the
54. See, e.g., White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503, 507-08 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900
(1954); Harris v. Ciccone, 290 F. Supp. 729, 733 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 479 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1078 (1970).
55. See, e.g., Kasey v. Goodwyn, 291 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
959 (1962); Bisson v. Howard, 224 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 916 (1955).
56. See, e.g., Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959): "It is sometimes stated that
if the military reviewing authorities have considered and decided the constitutional questions
sought to be raised in a habeas corpus case, then the matter is at an end, and the civil court Is
without jurisdiction. In the court's view, that statement is too broad. . . . [If a careful
examination of the record compels a conclusion that there is no evidence to sustain the judgment
or that in fact petitioner was not represented by an attorney, or that it must be said that basic
constitutional rights were violated, it would seem that a civil court would have jurisdiction to
grant relief because under such circumstances it cannot be said that the reviewing military
authorities fairly considered these questions." Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
57. See Sunday v. Madigan, 301 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1962); Crigler v. United States
Army, 285 F.2d 260, 261 (10th Cir. 1961); McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643, 644 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960); Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232, 234 (10th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958); Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317, 320 (10th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1958); Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1955); Easley v.
Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1953); Dennis v. Taylor, 150 F. Supp. 597 (M.D. Pa. 1957);
Bokoros v. Kearney, 144 F. Supp. 221, 228 (E.D. Tex. 1956). In determining whether the
military dealt fully and fairly with an issue, these courts did not look to see if correct
:constitutional standards were applied. Many of these courts, applying the Burns standard, merely
looked to see if the military had dealt with the issue. In Easley v. Hunter, supra, for example, the
court stated: "[A]s we understand the Bums decision, it does no more than hold that a military
court must consider questions relating to the guarantees afforded an accused by the Constitution
and when this is done, the civil courts will not review its action." 209 F.2d at 487. See Note,
Procedural Deficiencies of Courts-Martial and Civilian Judicial Review: Lieutenant Calley's Case,
28 Rutgers L. Rev. 626, 671 (1975). More recent cases, some of them noting the confusion In the
area, have apparently rejected the Bums holding. See, e.g., Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d
Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Allen v. Van Cantfort, 436 F.2d 625 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971); Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970).
58. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), was a third possible case In which some
of the confusion could have been cleared up. Although the case did not involve a collateral attack
on a court martial conviction, the Court stated. "[I]mplicit in the congressional scheme embodied
in the [Uniform] Code [of Military Justice] is the view that the military court system generally Is
adequate to and responsibly will perform its assigned task. We think this congressional judgment
must be respected and that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate
servicemen's constitutional rights." Id. at 758.
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confusion. In United States v. Augenblick,5 9 the Court refused to allow
consideration of Jencks Act violations. 60 Even if it were assumed that the
Court of Claims could review a defect in a constitutional decision, the Court
felt that the Jencks Act claims were not of constitutional stature and thus
were not subject to collateral review. 61 According to at least one commen-
tator, Augenblick limits the Burns test to asserted violations of constitutional
rights.62 While this view has been generally accepted, 6 3 Augenblick failed to
define the extent to which a civilian court should defer to the findings of a
military court.
The Court again had a chance to clarify Burns in Parker v. Levy. 64 In
Parker the Court alluded to Burns by noting that issues raised by the petitions
which were not treated by the court of appeals could not be reviewed on
appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court stated that such issues should be
reviewed by the court of appeals in the first instance in order to meet the
Burns requirements. 65 Despite this reference to Burns, the Court failed to
address itself to the Third Circuit's rejection of "the contention that full
presentation of the constitutional issues to a court-martial precludes subse-
quent consideration of those issues by a civilian court." 66 The Court's failure
to address the Third Circuit position, coupled with its own review of the
constitutional issues 67 raised can be pointed to as evidence of rejection of the
59. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). The Jencks Act provides that the United States must produce for
the defense any prior statements made by a witness who was called by the government to testify,
and which relates to the subject matter of the witness' testimony.
61. 393 U.S. at 351-52.
62. Note, Procedural Deficiencies of Courts-Martial and Civilian Judicial Review: Lieutenant
Calley's Case, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. 626, 672-73 (1975).
63. E.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 199 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W.
3564 (U.S. April 6, 1976) (No. 75-773); Owings v. Secretary of the Air Force, 447 F.2d 1245, 1261
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 926 (1972); Davies v. Resor, 445 F.2d 1331, 1332 (Ist
Cir. 1971).
64. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). This case involved a habeas corpus proceeding in which an Army
captain sought relief from a general court-martial conviction obtained pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§
890, 933-34 (1970).
65. 417 U.S. at 762.
66. 478 F.2d at 783.
67. Captain Levy was charged under 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970) which punishes one who
"willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer." As a result of
handing out statements which were opposed to the Vietnam War, Captain Levy was also charged
under id. § 933 with "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." In addition, he was
charged with a violation of id. § 934 which forbids "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces." 417 U.S. at 736-38. In addressing the principal
issues raised, concerning the vagueness of the latter two statutes, the Court noted that "the
military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." Id. at 743. The
Court felt that there were two sources which imparted specific content to the statutes thereby
eliminating the vagueness contentions. First, there were military customs and usages which
servicemen may be expected to understand. Id. at 746-47. In addition, the Court pointed out that
the language of the articles had been narrowly construed by the United States Court of Military
Appeals. Id. at 754. The Court further declared that "[tlhe fundamental necessity for obedience,
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Burns approach. 68 The precedential value of this case appears to be minimal,
however, in light of its deference to military needs, 69 and because of its failure
to lay down any guidelines regarding civilian court review of military habeas
corpus petitions.
IV. Calley v. Callaway
Concerned with the uncertainty regarding the proper scope of review in
military habeas corpus proceedings, the Fifth Circuit in Calley v. Callaway70
has attempted to clarify the boundary of such review. Following a court-
martial conviction arising out of incidents in Vietnam, 71 Lieutenant William
Calley sought habeas corpus relief in federal district court challenging his
conviction. The district court granted the relief and the Army appealed, while
Calley cross-appealed. 72 The Fifth Circuit held that it was erroneous for the
district court to have issued a writ of habeas corpus to Calley. Calley raised
four issues in his plea: (1) prejudicial pre-trial publicity; (2) failure to subpoena
certain defense witnesses; (3) refusal of the United States House of Represen-
tatives to release essential evidence; and (4) inadequacy of notice in the bill of
particulars.
73
As to the first issue, the court declared that there were no special military
considerations which would justify departing from current standards74
and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the
military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." Id. at 758.
68. At least one writer has argued that Parker could be construed as having abandoned the
Burns approach. See Note, Procedural Deficiencies of Courts-Martial and Civilian Judicial
Review: Lieutenant Calley's Case, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. 626, 673 (1975).
69. 417 U.S. at 758.
70. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. April 6, 1976) (No.
75-773). The court noted that "[flederal courts have interpreted Burns with considerable dis-
agreement." Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted).
71. On March 16, 1968 a number of unarmed and unresisting Vietnamese civilians were
killed by American soldiers in the small village of My Lai, South Vietnam. Calley, a platoon
leader, was found guilty of "the murder of not less than one human being" at a trail in the
southern part of My Lai. Id. at 192. He was also found guilty of "the murder of not less than
20 persons" at a ditch in the eastern part of My Lai. Id. at 192. Calley was also found guilty of
premeditated murder for the death of a forty- to fifty-year-old monk. Id. In addition, he was found
guilty of "assault with intent to commit murder" because of shooting at a young child. Id. at 193.
Calley admitted participating in the killings at the trail and at the ditch. He denied, however,
killing either the monk or the young child. Calley claimed that he was "not legally responsible for
the killings because there was an absence of malice on his part" and also because he was allegedly
ordered by superior officers "to kill everyone in the village." Id. For an interesting discussion of
the trial and surrounding events see R. Hammer, The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley (1971).
72. 519 F.2d at 191.
73. Id. at 194.
74. Id. at 203-04. The court cited Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), and Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), to support its formulation of the general rule that "a defendant
has the burden on appeal of proving actual jury prejudice if a conviction is to be reversed on
grounds of prejudicial publicity." 519 F.2d at 204. In Irvin, an individual was tried and
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Numerous murders had been committed in the
vicinity, and they were given detailed coverage by the local news media. Although the court
argued that the burden of showing actual jury prejudice was on the "challenger," the court did
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and that Calley's claim lacked merit. 7S With regard to the second issue raised,
Calley argued that the failure of the military judge to subpoena certain
witnesses76 requested by him deprived him of due process and of the right to
confront witnesses and to have compulsory process.7 7 The court decreed that
further review of this issue by civilian courts was barred since the military
judge held that there was no factual basis for the allegations underlying
Calley's request, and since the Court of Military Review dealt fully and fairly
with the military judge's conclusion.7 8
As to Calley's argument that he was denied due process because the House
of Representatives refused to release certain testimony concerning the My Lai
massacre which it had obtained in executive session,7 9 the Fifth Circuit held
that there was no due process violation8 0 and that Congressional failure to
supply the testimony, even if it were assumed to be a violation of the Jencks
Act,8 1 did not rise to the level of a constitutional error.8 2 Review of such an
issue would thus not be proper in a civilian court.
8 3
note that " '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' In the ultimate
analysis, only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or his life." 366 U.S. at 722. (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). In Reynolds, the Court noted- "Unless [the challenger]
shows the actual existence of such [a prejudicial] opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the
presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside, and it will not be error in
the court to refuse to do so." 98 U.S. at 157.
75. The court felt that Calley's claim lacked merit because much of the publicity was
favorable to Calley because of the long period of time between the height of the publicity and the
trial; and because Calley sought as jury members individuals who were aware of the conditions in
Vietnam. 519 F.2d at 205-13.
76. Calley requested that Secretary of Defense Laird, Secretary of the Army Resor, and Chief
of Staff of the Army Westmoreland appear as witnesses in order that Calley could establish the
defense that the charges brought against him were done so as a result of command influence. Id.
at 213.
77. Id. at 194. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to . .. be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
78. 519 F.2d at 217 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 194. After national attention had been drawn to the case, the House Armed
Services Committee appointed an investigating subcommittee to review the case. "[Tihe subcom-
mittee interviewed 152 witnesses, held 16 days of hearings, took 1,812 pages of sworn testimony,
and examined hundreds of documents. In addition, the subcommittee took 3,045 pages of
statements from witnesses, and conducted its own field investigation in Vietnam." Id. at 219.
80. The court stated that there was no due process violation because of "the vast amount of
pretrial discovery afforded the petitioner, the fact that the defense possessed prior statements by
all witnesses who testified both before the Hebert Subcommittee and the court-martial, [and
because of] the noncritical nature of many of the witnesses' testimony . . . ." Id. at 223. In
addition, the court noted that the prosecution was not responsible for the withholding of the
evidence. Id.
81. The court did not reach the issue of whether congressional failure to provide the
testimony was a violation of the Jencks Act. Id. at 225.
82. Id. at 226.
83. Id. at 199-200.
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The last major issue raised by Calley, that he was not adequately notified of
the charges against him, resulting in a risk of double jeopardy,84 was easily
disposed of. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the military judge gave
detailed instructions requiring the prosecution to prove its case in conformity
with the allegations set out in the bill of particulars. Since Calley did not
deny participating in the killings, the court found it difficult to comprehend
how Calley was "deprived of fair notice of the charges against him when he
confirms that the alleged incidents happened and that he participated in
them."8 5
In its analysis of these issues, the Fifth Circuit utilized a standard of review
that differs from the Burns test as it has been interpreted by many courts. 86
The court declared that the scope of civilian review should depend on the
nature of the issues raised and that "four principal inquiries are necessary" in
order to determine what the nature of the issues are.8 7 According to the court,
the first inquiry to be asked by a civilian judge is whether the asserted error
committed by the military is of constitutional dimension, or is so fundamental
as to have resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice. 88
The second inquiry is whether the disputed issue is one of fact or of law.
According to the court, "a conclusion that a military prisoner's claim is one of
law and not intertwined with disputed facts previously determined by the
military is one important factor which favors broader review."8 9 Third, the
court must inquire whether the disputed constitutional issue requires different
treatment because of special military considerations. If the constitutional
claim raised by the petitioner has been dealt with by the court-martial, and if
the tribunal has determined that the petitioner's position on this claim would
have an adverse effect on the military, then according to the court, civilian
courts should not interfere.9 0
84. Id. at 194.
85. Id. at 227.
86. The court declared that consideration of issues by the military would not preclude further
review by civil courts. Id. at 203. In so holding, the court apparently rejected the contention
raised by some earlier cases that once the military has reviewed an issue further review is barred
by civil courts. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. There have been courts which have
expressed a viewpoint similar to Calley. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 342
(10th Cir. 1967); Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Application of Stapley,
246 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Utah 1965).
87. 519 F.2d at 199.
88. Id. at 199-200. See also United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Kauffman v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970);
Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392, 1395-96 (D.D.C. 1972).
89. 519 F.2d at 200.
90. Id. at 200-03. Deference to the military is shown by the fact that many civil courts will
not review cases concerning military "orders, duty assignments, personnel status, and other
non-discharge administrative determinations." Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determina-
tions and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 Va. L. Rev. 483, 493 (1969). Although
civil courts have shown a reluctance to intrude into certain areas of military life, the Supreme
Court in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam), held that civil courts have the
power to review internal military affairs to determine if an official has acted outside the scope of
his authority. Lower courts have held that review is available where the military has violated Its
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Finally, the court must determine whether the military has given adequate
consideration to the issues involved, and whether the military has applied "a
proper legal standard to disputed factual claims." 9'
In summary, the court stated:
Military court-martial convictions are subject to collateral review by federal civil
courts on petitions for writs of habeas corpus where it is asserted that the court-martial
acted without jurisdiction, or that substantial constitutional rights have been violated,
or that exceptional circumstances have been presented which are so fundamentally
defective as to result in a miscarriage of justice. Consideration by the military of such
issues will not preclude judicial review for the military must accord to its personnel the
protections of basic constitutional rights essential to a fair trial and the guarantee of
due process of law. The scope of review for violations of constitutional rights,
however, is more narrow than in civil cases. Thus federal courts should differentiate
between questions of fact and law and review only questions of law which present
substantial constitutional issues. Accordingly, they may not retry the facts or reevalu-
ate the evidence, their function in this regard being limited to determining whether the
military has fully and fairly considered contested factual issues. 92
By holding that the scope of review "depends on the nature of the issues
raised," 93 the Calley opinion has focused attention on the central point which
should govern the direction of a military habeas corpus proceeding. In
limiting civilian review to substantial constitutional issues 94 and by proscrib-
own regulations. See, e.g., Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir. 1970); Van Bourg v.
Nitze, 388 F.2d 557, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Civilian review has also extended to a determina-
tion of whether military statutes, executive orders, and regulations were constitutional. See
United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 197
(1972); Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D. N.J. 1968); Morse v. Boswell, 289 F. Supp.
812 (D. Md.), aff'd, 401 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1052 (1969). But
see Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971); Raderman v.
Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 976 (1969).
91. 519 F.2d at 203. See also Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.Zd 991 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970), where the court stated that "the test of fairness
[under Bums] requires that military rulings on constitutional issues conform to Supreme Court
standards, unless it is shown that conditions peculiar to military life require a different rule." Id.
at 997. See also Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392, 1395-96 (D.D.C. 1972). In reviewing internal
military affairs, the standard of review tends to vary with the nature of the issues raised. A
challenge to a discretionary decision will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. E.g.,
Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1970); Nixon v. Secretary of the Navy, 422 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.
1970). Decisions dealing with conscientious objector applications are reviewed like draft cases,
under the "any basis in fact" test. E.g., Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.), application for
stay denied, 399 U.S. 902 (1970); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). In reviewing
allegations that the military failed to follow its own regulations, the courts will look to see if the
regulations were in fact not followed and if there was a showing of prejudice to the petitioner.
E.g., Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1971). Claims that enlistment contracts have
been breached or are invalid will be reviewed under traditional notions of contract law. E.g.,
Johnson v. Chafee, 469 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Shelton v.
Brunson, 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972); see Chalfant v. Laird, 420 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1969).
92. 519 F.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 199-200.
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ing civilian review of factual claims unless the military has failed to fully and
fairly consider them, 95 the Calley standard prevents unwarranted intrusion
into military affairs. 96 Furthermore, Calley does recognize that under certain
circumstances the needs of the military may require that constitutional claims
be treated differently than they otherwise would be. 97 Such a standard
accords to the individual serviceman the assurance that his constitutional
rights will be upheld by the civilian courts if they have not already been
upheld by the military. In addition, the military is assured that it will be
accorded proper deference when the situation involved demands it.
By focusing on the nature of the issues raised, and not on the extent to
which the military has reviewed the issues, the Calley standard avoids much
of the inherent ambiguity which surrounded the Burns "fully and fairly" test.
Deference to the military should be shown not by failing to review an issue,
but by reviewing it in the light of an informed understanding of military needs
and processes. While there are differences between military and civilian
processes, such differences should not form the basis for rejecting the constitu-
tional claims of servicemen. 98 This is not to suggest that the military justice
system is unfair when it deals with the constitutional claims of servicemen. 99
Rather, it suggests that since constitutional standards are promulgated by
civilian judges, those same judges should be able to review the constitutional
claims of servicemen without worrying about the extent to which the military
95. Id. at 203. Compare the court's treatment of factual claims with the treatment espoused
by the Supreme Court for civilian situations in Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In
Townsend the Court held that "[w]here the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair
evidentiary hearing in a state court. . . ." Id. at 312. The Court also held that an evidentiary
hearing must be held: "If (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair
hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (S) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing. . . ." Id. at 313.
96. The scope of this review may not reach a resolution of the factual issues themselves, but
may only determine whether a proper legal standard was used by the court. 519 F.2d at 203.
97. Id. at 200-03.
98. Distinctions between federal and state processes have been noted, Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 140 (1953), and yet they have not prevented the Court from allowing full review of
constitutional issues in state habeas corpus proceedings. E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The analogy
between federal and state courts, however, is not completely similar to that which exists between
federal and military courts. At least two distinctions can be drawn. First, military courts, unlike
state courts, are article I courts. See note 6 supra. Secondly, unlike state court decisions, there Is
no direct appeal to the Supreme Court in military cases. See note 24 supra and accompanying
text.
99. On the contrary, the military justice system provides an accused with many advantages
which are not normally available to a civilian. For an interesting discussion and comparison of
the military and civilian systems of justice see Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice, 12 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 482 (1971). See also Kent, Practical Benefits for the Accused-A Case Comparison
of the U.S. Civilian and Military Systems of Justice, 9 Duquesne L. Rev. 186 (1970).
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has reviewed the issue.100 Fear that an expanded scope of review would open
the federal courts to a tide of unwarranted claims is ill founded since the
"exhaustion of remedies"10 1 requirement, in conjunction with the requirement
that only substantial constitutional claims be reviewed, would effectively
prevent minor claims from reaching the courts.' 0 2
The scope of review laid down in Calley is more closely analogous to that
which governs civilian habeas corpus cases than to that which traditionally
has governed military cases.1 03 In analyzing the issues presented to it, the
court carefully distinguished questions of law from questions of fact, with
factual determinations receiving greater deference than pure issues of con-
stitutional law. While such an approach differs from that taken by many post
Burns cases, 104 it is completely consonant with Burns if one reads Burns as
encompassing the rationale laid down in earlier civilian cases.' 05 To the
extent that one reads Burns as proscribing civilian review of constitutional
issues once they have been fully and fairly dealt with by the military, Calley
represents a significant departure from Burns.
Regardless of the perspective taken on the question of whether Burns
forecloses civilian review once the military has fully and fairly litigated a
contested constitutional issue, the CaUey standard represents a workable
approach 10 6 to military cases that has long been needed. Hopefully it will
100. In Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), Justice Douglas noted in dissent that "military
tribunals... are federal agencies subject to no other judicial supervision except what is afforded
by the federal courts .... [T]he rules of due process which they apply are constitutional rules
which we, not they, formulate." Id. at 154.
101. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
102. The notion that an expanded civilian habeas corpus caseload would put a significant
strain on federal courts has been likewise rejected. See Developments in the Law-Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1041-42 (1970).
103. Compare the Calley statement that "[c]onsideration by the military of such
[constitutional] issues will not preclude judicial review . . ." 519 F.2d at 203, with the
statement in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), that "[tlhe State court cannot have the last say
when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have
misconceived a federal constitutional right." Id. at 508. Contrast this attitude of the Court in civil
cases with its deferential statement in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), that the federal civil
courts should "take account of the prior proceedings-of the fair determinations of the military
tribunals after all military remedies have been exhausted." Id. at 142. For a comparison which
points out the similarity between the Calley standard in relation to factual allegations, and the
Court's treatment of the issue in civil cases see note 95 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
105. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953), the Court held that a state court's
determinations of constitutional law questions were reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings,
while a state's factual determinations would only be upset if unusual circumstances existed. See
also the separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter, id. at 506-07. See Developments in the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1052-62 (1970). Since the allegations in
Bums centered for the most part on factual contentions, see notes 41-43 supra and accompanying
text, the Court's decision could be viewed as following the rationale laid down in Brown.
106. Since Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the federal courts have had to deal
increasingly with requests for habeas corpus relief. See Note, Habeas Corpus v. Prison Regula-
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receive the sanction of the Supreme Court and, until such sanction is
forthcoming, will provide a basis for uniformity among the federal courts.
Gerard Hannon
tions: A Struggle in Constitutional Theory, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 50, 53 (1971). This experience In the
civilian sphere could be used to suggest a workable standard of review which would allow
civilian courts to review constitutional issues despite the fact that they were previously reviewed
by the military.
